We examine the association between voluntary disclosure quality and the capital market valuation of diversified firms. We propose a positive association between disclosure quality and firm value for two reasons: (1) a monitoring effect in which commitments to higher disclosure quality act as a disciplining device for managers otherwise inclined to over-invest; and, (2) an adverse selection effect in which commitments to higher disclosure quality mitigate the adverse selection problem faced by uninformed investors in the firm's securities. We study diversified firms because extant evidence suggests that the typical diversified firm trades at a discount relative to a benchmark portfolio of single segment firms and that this "diversification discount" is partially attributable to information asymmetry. Hence, focusing on diversified firms provides us with a powerful means of assessing the association between firm value and disclosure quality.
I. Introduction
In this study we examine the valuation implications of differences in firms' disclosure practices for a set of firms that are diversified by line of business. Evidence presented in the corporate finance literature indicates that the typical multi-segment firm trades at a discount relative to a benchmark portfolio of single segment firms (Lang and Stultz [1994] and Berger and Ofek [1995] ) and that this "diversification discount" or "negative excess value" is partially attributable to information asymmetry between managers (informed traders) and stockholders (Meyer, Milgrom and Roberts [1992] , Piotroski [1999] , Polk [2001a] and [2001b] ).
A variety of studies in the accounting literature suggest that commitments to higher disclosure quality reduce information asymmetry (Diamond and Verrecchia [1991] and Kanodia and Lee [1998] ). Taken together these two strands of the economics literature lead us to ask the following question: Is there a positive association between the excess value attributable to diversification and the quality of firms' disclosures?
We rely on two different theories to motivate our prediction that commitments to disclose are positively associated with the excess value of diversification. First, commitments to higher disclosure quality increase the precision of post decision information about management's investment and operating decisions; hence, commitments to disclose should reduce management's proclivity for investing in assets that destroy shareholder value (Kanodia and Lee [1998] and Healy and Palepu [2001] ). We refer to this as the monitoring effect of disclosure.
Second, commitments to disclose decrease the risk that uninformed investors will trade with privately informed parties. This increases the liquidity of the firm's securities, which, in turn, may reduce the information asymmetry component of its cost of capital (Diamond and Verrecchia [1991] ). We refer to this as the adverse selection effect of disclosure. Each theory predicts that commitments to disclose enhance firm value by reducing the level of asymmetric information between management (informed traders) and uninformed investors.
Our proxy for firms' commitment to provide high quality disclosure is based on the industry-adjusted disclosure ratings developed by the Association for Investment Management and Research (AIMR). The AIMR ratings are a well-accepted proxy for disclosure quality and are often used by accounting researchers. 1 We employ the excess value measure developed by Berger and Ofek [1995] as our proxy for the valuation effect attributable to diversification. This measure, which is frequently used in corporate finance studies, compares a firm's actual market value to an imputed value based on industry asset or sales valuation multiples applied to the firm's individual segments. To evaluate the relation between disclosure quality and the excess value attributable to diversification, we estimate pooled time-series and Fama-MacBeth [1973] regressions of excess values on AIMR disclosure rankings and several controls.
Our results reveal a positive association between excess values and the AIMR rankings.
We conduct several robustness tests to evaluate the sensitivity of this result. First, the results we document may be attributable to differences in firm performance. In particular, a number of theoretical studies suggest that firms in possession of good information are more likely to disclose (Verrecchia [1983] , Dye [1985] and Jung and Kwon [1988] ). Hence, in our expanded tests we include current period abnormal stock return, sales growth and earnings surprise as control variables. Our results are unaffected by the inclusion of these variables.
Second, the association between the excess value attributable to diversification and our disclosure proxy may be attributable to the mitigation of non-diversifiable estimation risk (Barry and Brown [1985] ). To evaluate this competing hypothesis we add several proxies that are related to firms' information environments. The association between the excess value of diversification and disclosure quality remains positive and significant after controlling for these constructs.
Finally, we also conduct our tests on a control sample of single segment firms whose disclosures are rated by the AIMR. Our motivation for studying multi-segment firms is that due to their complex operating activities, they are more likely to experience information asymmetry problems vis-à-vis single segment firms. Hence, we expect the association between disclosure quality and excess value to be stronger in the multi-segment population relative to single segment firms. Our results indicate that this is descriptive: the association between disclosure quality and excess value is generally insignificant in the single segment sample.
To further evaluate the source of the association between excess value and disclosure quality, we examine the association between accounting based measures of firm performance and the AIMR rankings. If the monitoring effect dominates the adverse selection effect, we expect a positive association between firm performance and disclosure quality. In particular, the monitoring effect implies that disclosure is associated with reduced over-investment on the part of management, which, in turn, is associated with greater profitability and growth. On the other hand, if the adverse selection effect dominates, we expect a negative association between firm performance and disclosure quality. This is based on the premise that commitments to disclosure reduce the firm's cost of capital, which, on the margin, implies it has greater access to outside funds that can be invested in non-negative NPV projects that are less profitable than its assets in place. We document a positive association between various accounting performance measures and disclosure quality for diversified firms; however, our results are not consistently statistically significant. Thus, we are unable to conclusively determine whether the monitoring effect or the adverse selection effect is the dominant phenomena underlying the association between disclosure quality and the excess value of diversification.
In summary, we demonstrate that the excess value attributable to diversification is increasing in the quality of firms' disclosures and this phenomenon is consistent with either the monitoring or adverse selection effects of disclosure. This study makes two contributions to the accounting and finance literatures. First, we examine a unique setting in which information problems are expected to have a relatively significant impact on firm value. This provides us with greater power, which, in turn, allows us to evaluate better the association between disclosure quality and firm value. Though standard setters and practitioners often tout the valuation benefits of voluntary disclosure, the academic evidence is mixed. Second, we explain cross-sectional variation in the excess value of diversification, which previous studies have been largely unable to do.
A caveat to our study is that we are unable to determine whether high quality disclosure is a causal factor that leads to a reduction in the diversification discount. Our research design identifies only an association between excess value and voluntary disclosure. In addition, much of the theory speaks to the ex-ante commitment of firms to a policy of disclosure, whereas the AIMR rankings measure the quality of firms' ex-post disclosure choices. We attempt to circumvent the second problem by using rankings that are measured six months prior to the dates corresponding to our excess value measures and by controlling for other known sources of variation in the AIMR scores that are not related to commitment per se. In addition, it is important to note that Botosan [1997] demonstrates a strong positive association between the AIMR scores and her proprietary measure of disclosure policy and Healy, Hutton and Palepu [1999] show that AIMR scores are quite persistent; hence, there exists evidence consistent with the notion that the AIMR scores are related to firms' commitments to disclose. Nonetheless, the fact remains that our proxy does not perfectly capture the theoretical construct.
The remainder of the manuscript unfolds as follows. In the next section we review the relevant diversification and disclosure literatures and state our main hypothesis. In section III we describe our primary variables of interest and provide a brief overview of our sample selection algorithm. We present empirical results in section IV and conclude in section V. An appendix describing the Berger and Ofek excess value methodology in detail follows the main text.
II. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development Literature Review

Research on Corporate Diversification
In a world of perfect capital markets investors can fully diversify their own portfolios;
hence, firms' diversification strategies are value neutral (Schall [1972] ). However, in the presence of capital market imperfections such as taxes or asymmetric information, corporate diversification has the potential to either enhance or destroy value. Regarding the value enhancing aspects of diversification, Lewellen [1971] argues that diversified firms have greater debt capacity than single segment firms, which, in turn, implies a larger debt tax shield and higher firm value. Diversification may further lower taxes by allowing the firm to immediately offset net operating losses generated by a particular segment against the profits of the remaining segments (Majd and Myers [1987] ). Chandler [1977] posits that diversification may lead to greater operating efficiency by enhancing economies of scope and increasing managerial coordination. In addition, to the extent divisional managers are able to convey information to central headquarters that cannot be credibly communicated to the external capital market, diversification may allow the firm to develop a set of efficient internal capital markets that can be used to mitigate potential under-investment (Weston [1970] and Stein [1997] ).
On the other hand, diversification may lead to value destruction, which is ultimately attributable to information asymmetries. First, the benefits of diversification described by
Chandler [1977] may be offset by costs associated with increased information asymmetry between headquarters and individual divisions (Harris, Kriebel and Raviv [1982] ). Second, in the presence of asymmetric information the potential for residual agency problems between management and shareholders exists. For instance, rather than using internal capital markets as a means of solving the under-investment problem, Meyer, Milgrom and Roberts [1992] argue that management may use the cash flow generated by healthy segments to subsidize underperforming segments. This sort of empire building can increase the value of resources under management's control, which, in turn, will likely increase their compensation and perquisite consumption (Jensen [1986] ). Finally, to the extent diversification exacerbates the adverse selection problem faced by uninformed investors, diversified firms may experience an increase in the information asymmetry component of their cost of capital (Diamond and Verrecchia [1991] , Piotroski [1999] and Gilson, Healy, Noe and Palepu [2001] ).
In two well-known empirical studies Lang and Stultz [1994] and Berger and Ofek [1995] demonstrate that, relative to a benchmark portfolio of single segment firms, the typical diversified firm trades at a discount. Hence the agency and information asymmetry costs of diversification appear to outweigh the tax and internal capital market benefits. However, evidence regarding the cross-sectional determinants of the diversification discount is scant.
Berger and Ofek [1996, 1999] document that the discount is reduced upon the occurrence of corporate events that "bust up" or "refocus" the firm. However, these events are costly mechanisms for monitoring the firm and essentially involve reversing the diversification decision. Denis, Denis and Sarin [1997] document a negative association between the level of diversification and the equity ownership of executives as well as the presence of large blockholders; however, they find no evidence to support the notion that ownership structure is associated with the diversification discount once the decision to diversify has been made.
One potential flaw in the methodologies used by Lang and Stultz [1994] and Berger and
Ofek [1995] is that the computation of "excess value" attributable to diversification is predicated on the assumption that reported segments of multi-division firms are directly comparable to their single segment counterparts. For example, evidence shown in Villalonga [2000a,b] , Campa and Kedia [2001] and Graham, Lemmon and Wolf [2001] suggests that the decision to diversify is endogenous and firms that ultimately become conglomerates trade at relatively low valuation multiples prior to the year in which they diversify. On the other hand, evidence presented in Lamont and Polk [2001a] suggests that approximately 50% of the variance in the Berger and Ofek's excess value measure is attributable to differences between the future cash flows of diversified and single segment firms. Moreover, Lamont and Polk [2001b] demonstrate a negative association between exogenous changes in diversity and changes in the Berger and Ofek measure. Hence, while a portion of the discount documented by Lang and Stultz [1994] and Berger and Ofek [1995] may be an artifact of their empirical designs, a significant portion appears attributable to value destruction by the firm. 
Voluntary Disclosure Literature
We focus on two strands of literature that predict a positive association between disclosure quality and firm value. The first focuses on the stewardship role that financial disclosures play in reducing residual agency costs. For example, Healy and Palepu [2001] argue that voluntary disclosure reduces agency costs by providing shareholders with an effective monitoring tool. We refer to this as the monitoring effect of disclosure. Kanodia and Lee [1998] develop a variant of the monitoring effect by demonstrating the benefits of increasing the precision of publicly disclosed information. In their model, investments made by the firm are verifiable, but management's private information is not. Management has an incentive to deceive capital market participants by over-investing in an attempt to signal that the firm has attractive prospects. In the absence of post-decision information investors assume above average investments constitute "puffing," so equilibrium investment is constant across firms, which is inefficient. Periodic performance reports alleviate this problem by providing investors with a means of evaluating management's decisions ex-post and meting out discipline via the price mechanism. Moreover, as the precision of post-decision information increases, so does an investor's ability to identify sub-optimal investment choices. Thus commitments to provide more precise, or higher quality, disclosures mitigate the over-investment problem in Kanodia and Lee [1998] .
Disclosure may also increase firm value by ameliorating the adverse selection problem faced by uninformed traders. In the presence of information asymmetry, market intermediaries will increase the bid-ask spread (Copeland and Galai [1983] , Glosten and Milgrom [1985] ) or reduce quoted depth (Kyle [1985] ). If the marginal investor faces a non-trivial likelihood of experiencing a future liquidity shock, these actions by the market maker lead to an increase in the firm's cost of capital (Amihud and Mendelson [1986] Evidence of a lower cost of capital for German firms that switch to US GAAP (or IAS) vis-à-vis their non-switching counterparts is presented in Leuz and Verrecchia [2000] . On the other hand, Botosan and Frost [1998] , Leuz [1999] and Monahan and Verrecchia [2000] are unable to find results consistent with the notion that improvements in disclosure reduce the information asymmetry component of firms' cost of capital.
Hypothesis
To summarize, asymmetric information is an important phenomenon underlying both the economic role of disclosure as well as the valuation implications of diversification. Hence, a natural extension of both bodies of literature is to evaluate the relation between cross-sectional variation in disclosure quality and excess value attributed to corporate diversification. In particular, given the mixed results of previous disclosure studies, we believe diversified firms provide a more powerful setting for evaluating the economic consequences of differences in disclosure quality. Our logic is that the potential valuation effects attributable to information asymmetry are likely more important for diversified firms than for focused firms. Moreover, given the lack of success of previous studies in identifying the source of cross-sectional variation in magnitudes of the diversification discount, the inclusion of disclosure quality as an explanatory variable may improve our understanding of this phenomenon.
In light of the above, we predict a positive association between excess value attributable to diversification as measured via the Berger and Ofek method and the quality of firms' disclosures as per the AIMR rankings. Because a positive association between disclosure quality and the excess value of diversification is consistent with both of the aforementioned disclosure effects as well as several other phenomena, we conduct several sensitivity tests, which are discussed in the next two sections.
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III. Research Design Primary Variables of Interest
Our measure of voluntary disclosure is based on the AIMR's annual corporate disclosure ratings. 4 Under the auspices of the AIMR a committee of security analysts that follow a particular industry evaluates the disclosure practices of firms in that industry. Within each industry, selected firms are evaluated on three dimensions: annual published information, quarterly and other published information, and investor relations. In addition, the three scores are combined into a summary disclosure rating (Total Disclosure Score or TDS), which serves as our proxy for disclosure quality. In order to remain consistent with prior research, we convert the raw total scores into percentile-ranks for each industry-year. This transformation is necessary because the AIMR scoring system is only consistent within an industry-year.
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While the AIMR scores evaluate firm disclosure policy along several dimensions, segment disclosures are some of the most important. Committee members are asked to evaluate the quality of the breakdown of sales, costs, earnings and other firm level data by segment, as well as whether management discusses industry trends and other information on a segment basis.
But in general, we view the pertinent disclosures for multi-segment firms to go beyond the quality of segment disclosures; hence, we believe the broad AIMR rankings are appropriate for our study.
While the AIMR does provide objective criteria to help rate the firms, it is likely that the disclosure scores are partially based on analysts' subjective evaluations; hence, a frequent criticism is that they are subject to the committee members' cognitive biases. For example, disclosure scores may reflect other attributes of the firm that are associated with the quality of disclosure, such as firm performance, rather than disclosure quality per se. We believe this bias is unlikely to be the source of our results for three reasons. First, in our multivariate regressions we include proxies for firm performance, size and other phenomena that are known to be associated with the AIMR scores Lundholm [1993, 1996] ). Second, we conduct our tests on a control sample of single segment firms that are also rated by the AIMR. If our results
are not fully attributable to omitted factors underlying the AIMR rating process, the results based on the single segment firms will be weaker than those based on the sample of multi-segment firms. Third, Botosan [1997] provides evidence of a positive association between the AIMR scores and her independently developed disclosure proxy and Lundholm and Myers [2000] demonstrate that firms with higher AIMR scores exhibit stock returns that are less correlated with current earnings realizations and more correlated with future earnings realizations. Taken together, the results of these two studies suggest that the AIMR scores are externally valid and that they capture value-relevant information about future outcomes that is disclosed in the current period.
We use the methodology developed by Berger and Ofek [1995] as the basis for developing our measure of excess value attributable to diversification. The following constitutes a brief overview of their approach. For further details please see the appendix. Excess value EXVAL is computed in the following manner (for ease of exposition we omit firm and time subscripts):
In equation (1) V is actual firm value as of the fiscal year end, which equals the sum of equity market value (the product of COMPUSTAT items 25 and 199) and the book value of total debt (the sum of COMPUSTAT items 9 and 34). IV denotes implied firm value and is calculated as follows:
In equation (2) i is a segment specific index, n is the number of segments reported, AI i is the reported amount for segment i of the particular accounting item of interest and IND i (V/AI) med equals the median multiple of firm value to the accounting item of interest for all single segment firms in the same industry as segment i. For each firm year we develop two measures of imputed value, one based on the median sales multiple (AI = sales) and one based on the median asset multiple (AI = assets), which we refer to as EXVAL_S and EXVAL_A, respectively. 6 The natural logarithm function captures the excess value of the total firm relative to the sum of its parts.
Consistent with Berger and Ofek, we remove observations having excess values greater than 1.386 or less than -1.386.
Overview of Sample Construction
To obtain our primary sample, which we refer to as the AIMR sample, we begin with all firm years included in the AIMR rankings during the time period spanning 1980 through 1996.
Next, as per Berger and Ofek [1995] we eliminate firm years that lack at least one segment on the COMPUSTAT Industry Segment (CIS) database, firm years having one or more segments in the financial services industry (SIC 6000-6999), firm years in which total assets are less than $20 million and firm years in which the absolute value of the difference between aggregate segment sales and total reported sales exceeds one percent of total reported sales.
IV. Empirical Results
Univariate Analysis
Descriptive statistics for a number of key variables of interest are presented in tables 1 and 2. For the sake of comparison with previous studies, panel A of table 1 contains statistics for the entire population of firms on the COMPUSTAT CIS database over the years 1980-1996 (i.e., the COMPUSTAT sample). The results shown in panel B of table 1 reveal two noteworthy differences between the AIMR and COMPUSTAT samples. First, the mean (median) excess value of firms covered by the AIMR is considerably higher than the excess value exhibited by firms that are from the broader COMPUSTAT population (still significantly negative, but closer to zero). For instance, the median of EXVAL_S (EXVAL_A) for the AIMR multi-segment firms of -0.02 (-0.07) is relatively closer to zero in comparison to the median EXVAL_S (EXVAL_A) of -0.11 (-0.11) exhibited by the COMPUSTAT multi-segment sample. In addition, the median EXVAL_S (EXVAL_A) of 0.13 (0.07) exhibited by the AIMR single segment sample is significantly different from zero and obviously greater than the median of the COMPUSTAT single segment sample, which is approximately zero by construction. Second, firms in the AIMR sample are larger and more profitable than firms in the COMPUSTAT sample, which is consistent with existing results about the characteristics of firms followed by analysts (Lang and Lundholm [1996] ).
The differences between the AIMR and COMPUSTAT samples suggest that our results may not generalize to the broader population of firms (i.e., there is potential for sample selection bias). Bias of this nature is particularly problematic if it is associated with the disclosure rankings. In particular, if there exists a latent variable that is associated with firms' excess values and the AIMR ratings but is unrelated to true disclosure quality, we may incorrectly infer a relation between disclosure quality and excess value when none exists. We take two courses of action to mitigate this concern. First, in addition to evaluating the relation between the AIMR ratings and excess value for multi-segment firms, we also evaluate this relation for single segment firms. If our results are purely attributable to latent variable bias, we should observe a positive relation between the AIMR ratings and excess value for both multi-segment and single segment firms. However, if the association between the AIMR ratings and excess value is concentrated in multi-segment firms, where problems of information asymmetries are expected to be more pronounced relative to single segment entities, concerns about latent variable bias are less warranted. Second, we include the controls listed in figure 1 in our regressions. We include these constructs because evidence presented in Lundholm [1993, 1996] suggests they are associated with the AIMR ratings.
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Figure One Description of Control Variables
Variable Name Description LEVERAGE Book value of long-term debt plus short-term debt deflated by total assets (sales multiple regressions) or sales (asset multiple regressions).
SALEGROW
Current year sales deflated by prior year sales.
MAR
One plus the market adjusted stock return for the fiscal year.
STDROE
Historical standard deviation of return on equity computed over the preceding ten years.
CORR
Historical correlation between annual stock returns and earnings per share computed over the preceding ten years.
SURPRISE
Absolute value of the difference between current year earnings per share and previous year earnings per share, divided by the stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year.
FOLLOW
Average monthly analyst following as per I/B/E/S during the year.
ERROR
The negative of the absolute value of the I/B/E/S consensus analyst forecast error deflated by the stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year.
DISPERSE
Average monthly inter-analyst standard deviation of I/B/E/S forecasts deflated by the stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year.
STDREVISE
Standard deviation of changes over the fiscal year in the median I/B/E/S forecast from the preceding month, deflated by the stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year.
Descriptive statistics pertaining to the control variables and the total disclosure score, TDS, for the AIMR sample are presented in table 2. Results for multi-and single segment firms are presented separately. A comparison of the medians of the two groups reveals that single segment firms tend to receive lower disclosure ratings, take on less debt, and attract less analyst following. In addition, multi-segment firms tend to have lower sales growth, less volatile return on equity, a lower correlation between their earnings and returns and more analyst disagreement about future performance as measured by the dispersion of analyst forecasts. 
Multivariate Analyses
Excess Value and Disclosure Quality
We begin by analyzing the relation between excess value and disclosure quality, in a model similar to the one estimated by Berger and Ofek [1995] . In particular, to test our main hypothesis we add TDS to the Berger and Ofek specification of the following regression:
We estimate equation (3) separately for multi-segment and single segment firms (we exclude NUMSEG and RELATED from the single segment specification because, as discussed below, these variables are moot). We estimate separate regressions using both measures of excess value (EXVAL = EXVAL_S, or EXVAL = EXVAL_A). In equation ( To more precisely identify the source of the positive association between excess value and disclosure quality, we add the control variables described in figure one to equation (3). In particular, we estimate the following regression: Table 5 shows the results of estimating equation (4) on the pooled data (industry fixed effects are included) as well as via the method described in Fama and MacBeth [1973] . The results reinforce the positive association between disclosure quality and excess value for multisegment firms but not for single segment firms. In addition, the magnitude of the estimated coefficient on TDS is stable across equations (3) and (4) for the multi-segment sample; hence, the economic relevance of disclosure appears robust.
The inclusion of the additional controls suggests that the association between the excess value attributable to diversification and disclosure quality is not attributable to differences in firm performance. A variety of extant models predict that firms in possession of favorable news are more likely to disclose as a means of separating themselves from "bad news firms" (Verrecchia [1983] , Dye [1985] and Jung and Kwon [1988] ). However, because we include several proxies for performance (PROFIT, SALEGROW, MAR and SURPRISE), it seems unlikely that our results are attributable to these sorts of signaling effects.
It is also unlikely that the reduction of estimation risk underlies the positive association between excess value and disclosure quality. While increased disclosure may reduce uncertainty, in turn, reducing the level of non-diversifiable estimation risk priced by the market (Barry and Brown [1985] ), the importance of estimation risk is likely related to firms' information environments. Hence, our controls for analyst following, analyst forecast characteristics, and firm size mitigate the potential that the association we document is attributable to a reduction in parameter uncertainty.
The results shown in table 4 are consistent with the notion that higher quality disclosure reduces information asymmetry, which, in turn, has a positive impact on the value of the firm.
The results from the expanded model in table 5 include alternative controls for estimation risk and signaling, yet the positive association between excess value and disclosure quality persists.
In the next section we further explore the source of this association by attempting to separate the monitoring and adverse selection effects.
Profitability, Sales Growth and Disclosure Quality
We further explore the source of the positive association between excess value and disclosure quality by regressing accounting measures of firm performance (profitability and growth) on AIMR rankings and several controls. We use both raw and industry-adjusted return on assets (ROA) and sales growth (SALEGROW) as dependent variables. If the monitoring effect dominates the adverse selection effect, commitments to provide a high level of disclosure quality will reduce management's consumption of private benefits of control (e.g., perquisites, negative NPV projects, etc.); hence, we will find a positive association between disclosure quality and firm performance. On the other hand, if the adverse selection effect dominates, increased disclosure will reduce the cost of capital, which, in turn, will reduce the firm's break-even rate of return. Hence, the firm will be able to invest in projects that are less profitable than its current assets in place but still have positive NPV. The models are as follows: 
To avoid spurious inferences, we use the log of sales as our proxy for size in equation (5) and the log of assets as our proxy for size in equation (6). To control for lifecycle differences and differences in growth opportunities, we include the ratio of sales to firm value, STM, in equation (5) and the ratio of assets to firm value, ATM, in equation (6). Finally, in equations (5) and (6) we use both raw and industry adjusted measures of ROA and SALEGROW. We industry adjust the variables in a manner similar to the method used to compute the excess value from diversification. To be precise, we use the following formulas to compute industry adjusted return on assets, ROA_ADJ, and industry adjusted sales growth, SG_ADJ.
In the equations shown above, i is the segment specific index, n denotes the number of reported Table 6 presents the results of estimating models (5) and (6) using both the pooled and Fama-MacBeth regressions. Panel A reports results where ROA (both raw and industryadjusted) is used as the dependent variable, while panel B uses SALEGROW (both raw and industry-adjusted). The coefficient of TDS is consistently positive across the various specifications; however, the statistical significance of the estimated coefficient varies considerably. In addition, the economic significance is questionable given the magnitude of the coefficient. Hence it is difficult to conclude whether the monitoring effect is the primary reason for the association between excess value and disclosure quality. It is important to note, however, that our tests lack power: they examine only a single year of accounting performance whereas firm value is based on investor expectations about performance over the remaining life of the entity.
V. Conclusion
We demonstrate a positive relation between disclosure quality as measured by firms' AIMR ratings and the excess value attributable to diversification as defined by Berger and Ofek [1995] . This result is robust to the choice of specification and is concentrated in multi-segment firms. Thus, it appears that higher disclosure quality has positive valuation implications for diversified firms. We offer two non-mutually exclusive explanations for this association. First, commitments to disclose provide shareholders with a means of monitoring management's behavior; hence, mitigating management's penchant for investing in negative NPV projects.
Alternatively, committing to disclose reduces the adverse selection problem faced by uninformed traders in the firm's securities. This, in turn, increases liquidity, which potentially increases firm value. Controls in our tests help rule out alternative explanations such as disclosure reducing non-diversifiable estimation risk or simply signaling that managers have good news about firm prospects.
Our results are relevant to both the accounting and finance literatures. Regarding the accounting literature, our results demonstrate that disclosure quality is positively associated with firm value. This result is meaningful given the inconclusive nature of the extant evidence regarding the economic consequences of firms' disclosure choices. Our results contribute to the finance literature by providing further evidence on the factors underlying inter-firm variation in the diversification discount.
Our study leaves two important, non-mutually exclusive, questions unanswered. First, we are unable to distinguish between the monitoring effect and the adverse selection effect.
Hence, the underlying source of the positive association between firm value and disclosure remains ill defined. Second, we are unable to determine whether disclosure policy is a causal factor underlying firm value or simply associated with firm value. We believe each of these questions represent fruitful avenues for future research.
1 Lang and Lundholm [1993] initiated the use of AIMR ratings as proxies for disclosure quality.
The appendix to Healy, Hutton and Palepu [1999] provides an example of the criteria underlying the AIMR ratings process and Bushee and Noe [2000] provide a thorough description of the properties of the AIMR ratings and an in depth review of research studies evaluating the relation between firms' AIMR ratings and various phenomena.
2 Moreover, we examine cross-sectional variation of firm values within a population of multisegment firms. Unlike much of the corporate diversification research, our tests do not seek to explain differences across multi-and single segment firms, but rather within the multi-segment population.
3 An alternative competing hypothesis to our prediction is that disclosure quality and excess values are in fact negatively associated. If poor performing multi-segment firms commit to higher disclosure as a means of "solving" their valuation problems or if undervalued multisegment firms use disclosure to signal that their stock price is too low, we will find a negative association between disclosure quality and excess value. This possibility weakens the power of our tests. 4 A variety of empirical accounting studies employ the AIMR scores as a measure of disclosure quality. Lang and Lundholm [1993] provide a detailed description of the procedures used by the AIMR (pp. 253-256) and an in-depth evaluation of the association between the AIMR scores and a number of phenomena (e.g., size, performance and volatility). Examples of other studies that use the AIMR scores are: Lang and Lundholm [1996] , Botosan [1997] , Healy, Hutton and Palepu [1999] , Bushee and Noe [2000] and Brown, Finn and Hillegeist [2001] . 5 The results reported in the text are based on regressions in which only the AIMR scores are converted into percentile ranks. To evaluate the sensitivity of our results, we re-estimate our regressions on the data after converting all of the variables of interest into percentile ranks. The un-tabulated results corresponding to these regressions are similar to those reported in the tables. 6 Berger and Ofek [1995] also estimate implied values using multiples of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) for each segment. This approach is problematic, however, because EBIT is often near zero or negative. Berger and Ofek circumvent this issue to some extent by replacing EBIT with EBITDA when EBIT is less than zero, and using the sales multiple when EBITDA is less than zero. We believe these solutions are rather ad-hoc and that they likely yield relatively noisy value estimates; hence, we limit our analysis to asset and sales based multiples.
7 By construction, the mean (median) excess value for single segments firms should equal zero; however, because we eliminate extreme outliers the mean excess value differs slightly from zero. 8 In addition to the variables discussed in Lundholm [1993, 1996] we include a proxy for capital structure LEVERAGE and an additional proxy for performance SALEGROW. The motivation for our capital structure proxy is that evidence provided in Sengupta [1998] suggests that disclosure reduces the cost of debt financing, which, at the margin, will cause the firm to "lever up." This, in turn, may increase the value of the firm's tax shields. Hence, by controlling for differences in capital structure, we mitigate against potential bias related to tax effects. We include the proxy for sales growth simply to err on the side of caution. 9 To evaluate potential bias in our inferences attributable to serial dependence in the data, we aggregate the t-statistics from each of the regressions shown in the text into Z-statistics as per Barth [1994] . These un-tabulated results yield inferences similar to those reported in the text.
The Calculation of Excess Value Using a Multiplier Approach
As discussed in Section III, equations (1) and (2) below are used to calculate our estimates of excess value (EXVAL) and implied value (IV). The methodology we employ is identical to that used by Berger and Ofek [1995] .
In equations (1) and (2): As per equation (1) the excess value of the multi-segment firm equals the natural logarithm of the ratio of actual firm value to the implied value calculated in equation (2).
Implied values are derived with a multiplier approach. Specifically, a value is assigned to each segment i and these segment values are summed to impute a measure of firm value. Values are assigned to each segment based on the product of an accounting item (sales or assets) and the median industry multiple of firm value to the accounting measure.
The "industry" for each segment is defined as the narrowest SIC grouping that includes at least five single segment firms with sales of $20 million and sufficient data to calculate the valuation multiple of interest. In particular, we first attempt to define an industry by the fourdigit SIC code for the segment. If five or more firms with the same four-digit SIC code as the segment meet the size and data availability requirements, then that constitutes the segment's industry for our purposes. Otherwise, we attempt to define the industry by the segment's threedigit SIC code. If the three-digit code fails to yield an industry based on our requirements, we move to the two-digit SIC code (there was never a case where we needed to use a one-digit code). All firms reporting a segment in a financial services industry (SIC 6000-6999) are excluded.
We remove all observations having excess values greater than 1.386 or less than -1.386, as these are considered outliers. We also exclude firms in which the sum of segment sales are not within 1% of total firm sales as per COMPUSTAT. Because total firm assets often include corporate assets that are unallocated to segments, a 1% cutoff is too extreme. Therefore, we excluded firms from the asset multiple analyses when the sum of segment assets deviates by more than 25% of total firm assets. For the retained firms, we assigned the difference between the sum of segment assets and total firm assets to the individual segments on a pro rata basis based on their percentage of reported assets. Table 1 Descriptive statistics for single and multi-segment firms over the time period 1980-1996.
Panel A pertains to all firm-years on the COMPUSTAT Industry Segment (CIS) database with sufficient data for calculating excess value from diversification. Panel B pertains to all firmyears on the CIS database with sufficient data for calculating excess value and that have been rated by the Association for Investment Management and Research (AIMR).
Panel A -Firms on the CIS database. TDS is the ranking of a firm's disclosure quality relative to its industry peers by the AIMR committee covering that industry. Disclosure quality is assessed along three dimensions: annual published information, quarterly and other published information, and investor relations. MAR equals one plus the market adjusted stock return for the year. STDROE equals the historical standard deviation of return on equity computed over the ten years preceding the event year. CORR equals the historical correlation between annual stock returns and earnings per share computed over the preceding ten years. SURPRISE equals the absolute value of the difference between current year earnings per share and previous year earnings per share, divided by the stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year. FOLLOW equals the average monthly analyst following per I/B/E/S during the year. ERROR equals the negative of the absolute value of the I/B/E/S consensus analyst forecast error deflated by the stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year. DISPERSE equals the average monthly inter-analyst standard deviation of I/B/E/S forecasts deflated by the stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year. STDREVISE equals the standard deviation of changes over the fiscal year in the median I/B/E/S forecast from the preceding month, deflated by the stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year. Table 3 Correlation structure for single and multi-segment firms on the CIS and AIMR databases over the time period 1980-1996.
Multi-Segment Firms
Panels A and B pertain to all firm-years on the CIS database with sufficient data for calculating excess value from diversification and that have been rated by the AIMR. Pearson correlations are shown below the diagonal with spearman correlations above.
Panel A -Multi-segment Firms. LOGSIZE and PROFIT equal the log of assets and return on assets in the regressions in which EXVAL_S is the dependent variable. LOGSIZE and PROFIT equal the log of sales and profit margin in the regressions in which EXVAL_A is the dependent variable. Please see tables 1 and 2 for definitions of the remaining variables. Table 5 Regression results for single and multi-segment firms on the CIS and AIMR databases over the time period 1980-1996.
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Panels A and B pertain to all firm-years on the CIS database with sufficient data for calculating excess value from diversification and that have been rated by the AIMR. Pooled results relate to estimation on the full panel of data (annual fixed effects are included but not shown). The coefficients reported for the Fama-MacBeth results equal the average of the annual coefficients and the t-statistics are calculated in the manner described in Fama and MacBeth [1973] . LOGSIZE, PROFIT, and LEVERAGE equal the log of assets, return on assets, and debt to assets, respectively, in the regressions in which EXVAL_S is the dependent variable. LOGSIZE, PROFIT, and LEVERAGE equal the log of sales, profit margin, and debt to sales, respectively, in the regressions in which EXVAL_A is the dependent variable. Please see tables 1 and 2 for definitions of the remaining variables. Table 6 Regression results for single and multi-segment firms on the CIS and AIMR databases over the time period 1980-1996.
Panels A and B pertain to all firm-years on the CIS database with sufficient data for calculating excess value from diversification and that have been rated by the AIMR. Pooled results relate to estimation on the full panel of data (annual fixed effects are included but not shown). The coefficients reported for the Fama-MacBeth results equal the average of the annual coefficients and the t-statistics are calculated in the manner described in Fama and MacBeth [1973] .
Panel A -ROA as a measure of profitability. 
